

## **TOWARDS THE ESSENCE, IMPORTANCE AND RETHINKING OF THE PHENOMENON OF PARTY GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES**

The article is devoted to analyzing the nature and attributes of party government and party governance in European representative democracies, in particular at the background of the relationship between the state, parties and civil society. As a result, attributes have been identified that indicate the expediency of forming party governments for representative democracies, but also some defective manifestations of party government and alternatives to party government have been outlined. On this basis, it is stated that party governments are the “standard” of representative democracies among European countries, although they are or may be characterized by both immanent and congenital defects and distortions associated with the phenomenon of party patronage, the difference between political and bureaucratic components of governance, “decline” or “crisis” of the concept and phenomena of party in Europe, etc. In other words, it is specified that visually, constructively and by the nature of parliamentary support, party governments have been and remain predominant ones in European representative democracies, but they have more and more obvious alternatives, including in the format of non-party and semi-party governments.

*Keywords:* government, party, party government, non-party government, semi-party government, patronage, partocracy, representative democracy, European countries.

## **CHARAKTER I ATRYBUTY PARTYJNEGO RZĄDU I PARTYJNEGO ZARZĄDZANIA W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PRZEDSTAWICIELSKICH**

W artykule przeanalizowano charakter i atrybuty partyjnego rządu i partyjnego zarządzania w europejskich demokracjach przedstawicielskich, w szczególności na tle relacji między państwem, partiami i społeczeństwem obywatelskim. W rezultacie zidentyfikowano atrybuty wskazujące na celowość tworzenia rządów partyjnych dla reprezentatywnych demokracji, ale także nakreślono pewne wadliwe przejawy rządów partyjnych i alternatywy dla rządów partyjnych. Na tej podstawie stwierdza się, że rządy partyjne są „standardem” demokracji przedstawicielskich wśród krajów europejskich, choć charakteryzują się lub mogą charakteryzować się zarówno immanentnymi, jak i wrodzonymi wadami oraz zniekształceniami związanymi ze zjawiskiem patronatu partyjnego, różnicą między politycznym i biurokratycznym komponentem rządu, „upadek” lub „kryzys” koncepcji i zjawisk partii w Europie itp. Innymi słowami, stwierdzono, że wizualnie, konstruktywnie i z natury

parlamentarnego poparcia rządu partyjne były i pozostają dominujące w europejskich demokracjach przedstawicielskich, ale mają coraz bardziej oczywiste alternatywy, w tym w formie bezpartyjnych i rządów półpartyjnych.

*Słowa kluczowe: rząd, partia, rząd partyjny, rząd bezpartyjny, rząd półpartyjny, patronat, partyjność, demokracja przedstawicielska, kraje europejskie.*

## **ДО СУТНОСТІ, ВАЖЛИВОСТІ ТА ЧАСТКОВОГО ПЕРЕОСМИСЛЕННЯ ФЕНОМЕНА ПАРТІЙНОГО УРЯДУ В ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ**

У статті проаналізовано природу та атрибути партійного уряду та партійного урядування в європейських представницьких демократіях, зокрема на тлі взаємовідносин між державою, партіями та громадянським суспільством. Як наслідок виявлено атрибути, які засвідчують про доцільність формування саме партійних урядів для представницьких демократій, однак також окреслено певні дефектні вияви партійного урядування та альтернативи партійному уряду. На цій підставі констатовано, що партійні уряди є “стандартом” представницьких демократій серед країн Європи, хоча для них властиві чи можуть бути властиві як іманентні, так і вроджені дефектний деформації, які пов’язані із феноменом партійного патронажу, різністю відносин між політичною бюрократичною складовими урядування, “занепадом” чи “кризою” поняття та явища партії у Європі тощо. Інакше кажучи, констатовано, що візуально, конструктивно та за характером підтримки в парламентах партійні уряди були та залишаються переважаючими у європейських представницьких демократіях, але вони мають все більше й більше очевидних альтернатив, у тому числі в форматі непартійних та напівпартійних урядів.

*Ключові слова: уряд, партія, партійний уряд, непартійний уряд, напівпартійний уряд, патронаж, партіократія, представницька демократія, країни Європи.*

An attribute of representative democracy, especially in European countries, is that the struggle for political power and the exercise of political power takes place in the context of ensuring the political representation of citizens by their certain “agents” – both institutional (head of state, parliament, government and other institutions) and functional (parties, interest groups, political and surrounding political organizations, etc.). Moreover, such an understanding of the content and orderliness of politics and the political process has long been the norm and in fact is not in doubt by citizens and civil society, although the latter often form additional tools to influence the political process, including various deliberative panels, discussion boards, forums, etc. especially against the background of the relentless development of new channels of political communication.

As a result, on the one hand, it is manifested in the fact that among various aspects and features of political and inter institutional relations, the norm for European representative democracies has long been the formation and functioning as basic and proper party cabinets<sup>1</sup>.

They appear to be a perfectly clear, relevant, statistical and empirical norm in almost all European representative democracies (except for a micro-state like Monaco, where party governments are not the norm), even regardless of their forms and systems of government<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, in recent decades (especially since the 1990s) in some European countries (including at different times in Austria, Andorra, Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Italy, Portugal, Ukraine, Finland, etc.) there have been non-partisan / technocratic government cabinets in the past<sup>3</sup>, and in other European countries (for example, in Greece, Estonia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Finland and especially in Romania and France, etc.) or in general in this part of the world governments are characterized by less party involvement, less party determination, although they visually preserve the party logic, party outlines and party framework<sup>4</sup>, but in fact appear as a kind of semi-party government cabinets<sup>5</sup>.

All this inevitably and quite logically puts on the agenda the question of the traditional and current essence, importance, rethinking and alternative of the phenomenon of party government in European representative democracies. The answer to this question is not one-syllable, but involves the passage of different stages and phases of the study. First of all, it is necessary to find out what the nature of party government is and why this format of government cabinet has become the norm for representative democracies in Europe. It is necessary then to characterize the definitive and essential attributes of party governments in representative democracies. And these things will give grounds to talk about alternatives and a possible rethinking of the phenomenon of party government against the background of the real political process in European representative democracies. Moreover, this will be especially relevant against the background of talks and theorizations

<sup>1</sup> Katz R., Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s. 31-71.; Rose R., The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique, "Political Studies" 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.

<sup>2</sup> Keman H., Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government, [w:] Luther K., Müller-Rommel F. (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207-246.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.; Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvosti mizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u trykutnyku „hlava derzhavy–parlament–uriad“ ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 306-308.; Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge I., *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): composition, duration, personnel*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Bialoblotskyi Z., Stablnist ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013, s. 215–239.; Marangoni F., Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office, "Bulletin of Italian Politics" 2012, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 135-149.; McDonnell D., Valbruzzi M., Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments, "European Journal of Political Research" 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., Non-partisan Governments Italian-style, "Journal of Modern Italian Studies" 2012, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 612-629.; Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., Panchak-Bialoblotska N., Politychni instytuty krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy: porivnialnyi analiz, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 181-189.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, "European Journal of Political Research" 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665-693.

<sup>4</sup> Katz R., Party Government and its Alternatives, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 1-26.; Mair P., The Challenge to Party Government, "West European Politics" 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.; Peters G., Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?, [w:] Farazmand A. (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage 1997, s. 232-254.

<sup>5</sup> Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv krain Vyshehradskoi hrupy ta inshykh krain Tsentralno-Skhidnoi Yevropy, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2016, s. 240;

that have become extremely widespread in recent decades on the topic of the “decline” or “crisis” of the parties’ phenomenon in European representative democracies. After all, many parties have really ceased to be as important as they used to be, and many have simply disappeared from the political arena, what, in turn, has definitely called into question the appropriateness of resorting to the party government format as a basic, instead, it brought to the fore the debate on rethinking and alternatives to the phenomenon of party government in Europe and, more generally, first of all, against the background of the transformation of already classical and traditional party systems in the various representative democracies in the region.

The set research tasks were largely isolated and analyzed by such scientists as R. Andeweg<sup>6</sup>, J. Blondel and M. Cotta<sup>7</sup>, I. Budge and H. Keman<sup>8</sup>, M. Calise<sup>9</sup>, F. Castles and R. Wildenmann<sup>10</sup>, H. Daalder<sup>11</sup>, L. De Winter<sup>12</sup>, R. Katz<sup>13</sup>, H. Keman<sup>14</sup>, M. Laver and I. Budge<sup>15</sup>, M. Laver and N. Schofield<sup>16</sup>, M. Laver and K. Shepsle<sup>17</sup>, P. Mair<sup>18</sup>, G. Pasquino and M. Valbruzzi<sup>19</sup>, R. Rose<sup>20</sup>, E. Schattschneider<sup>21</sup>, P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones<sup>22</sup>, J. Schlesinger<sup>23</sup>, J. Woldendorp, H. Keman and I. Budge<sup>24</sup> and many others.

<sup>6</sup> Andeweg R., *Elite-Mass Linkages in Europe: Legitimacy Crisis or Party Crisis?* [w:] Hayward J. (ed.), *Elitism, Populism, and European Politics*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1996, s. 143-163.

<sup>7</sup> Blondel J., *The Political Factors Accounting for the Relationship between Governments and the Parties Supporting them*, Wyd. European University Institute 1989; Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Budge I., *Party Identification and Beyond*, Wyd. Wiley 1976; Budge I., Keman H., *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990.

<sup>9</sup> Calise M., *Il governo di partito*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1989.

<sup>10</sup> Castles F., Wildenmann R., *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986.

<sup>11</sup> Daalder H., *A Crisis of Party?*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1992, vol 15, s. 269-288.

<sup>12</sup> De Winter L., *Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet*, [w:] Blondel J., Thiebault J. (eds), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*, London 1991, s. 44-69.

<sup>13</sup> Katz R., *Party Government and its Alternatives*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 1-26; Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s. 31-71.

<sup>14</sup> Keman H., *Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds), *Handbook on Political Parties*, Wyd. Sage 2006, s. 160-174; Keman H., *Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government*, [w:] Luther K., Müller-Rommel F. (eds), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207-246; Keman H., *Strategy Development and Variations of Party Government*, Paper presented at the conference “Political Strategy” (Lüneburg: Leuphana Universität), 12-13 February 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Laver M., Budge I., *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Macmillan 1992.

<sup>16</sup> Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

<sup>18</sup> Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, “West European Politics” 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.

<sup>19</sup> Pasquino G., *Governments in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2015, s. 295-310; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Il potere dell’alternanza. Teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo*, Wyd. Bononia University Press 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974; Rose R., *The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique*, “Political Studies” 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.

<sup>21</sup> Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942.; Schattschneider E., *Party Government and Employment Policy*, “American Political Science Review” 1945, vol 39, nr. 6, s. 1147-1157.

<sup>22</sup> Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665-693.

<sup>23</sup> Schlesinger J., *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1991.

<sup>24</sup> Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge I., *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): composition, duration, personnel*, Wyd. Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000.

In our study, we will try to systematize them and cover them as widely as possible.

Starting to solve the research tasks, it should be noted that parties in representative democracies in general and in Europe in particular have a special place in the relationship between civil society and the state and it is within the framework of these relations that the understanding of the essence and phenomenon of the party government cabinet is formed against the background of the dependence between the party / parties and the state / institutions of power. The fact is that in almost all representative democracies it is normal to have a certain distance between the policy pursued by an official / bureaucrat and the policy promoted and defended by one or another party member or party, and thus between the managerial and political components of the formation and functioning of governments and governance. Accordingly, due to the fact that parties are the main “agents” voted for during the formation / election of parliaments – and this is not in doubt – government cabinets must in some way inherit the political choices of citizens, and therefore they are composed of members of the elites of those political parties that win the election – alone or in groups or in coalitions.

And this, in turn, means that a party is considered to be a government cabinet whose members or ministers are representatives of parliamentary political parties, what, according to this logic, is considered to be a completely rational and consistent construction of the connection and mutual influence of civil society on the state through the channels of political parties as functional representatives of citizens. In this case, it is expected that members or representatives of party elites within government cabinets and their individual departments and ministries, when giving orders to bureaucrats, should be neutral, for it is the neutrality of officials / bureaucrats inherited or thus acquired that must remain unchanged in the change and rotation of parliamentary parties that form and support government cabinets and delegate their party functionaries as ministers to them, and so on. Otherwise, and vice versa, this is the reason for the formation and development of the phenomenon of political corruption in the functioning of party government cabinets, and thus significantly negativities the role of parties as a channel of interaction between the state / bureaucracy and civil society<sup>25</sup>. Although, in contrast, not in all representative democracies in Europe the distance between ministers and bureaucrats is equivalent and equally neutral, after all, for example, in some states the deputy ministers of party governments are non-partisan, and in some party political ones, and so on.

It follows that there are good grounds for establishing a certain framework for defining the phenomenon of party government in representative democracies. Thus, some researchers believe that party government cabinets are collegial bodies in the structure of the executive branch, which consist of members or representatives of parliamentary parties and are formed on the basis of party-parliamentary affiliation, and therefore in this context the main attribute of party

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<sup>25</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies, Wyd. Macmillan 1996.; Blondel J., Cotta M., The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

governments is the use and appeal to parliaments in the formation, support and functioning of governments as such. In other words, in the case of party governments, all or almost all of the ministerial and prime ministerial posts belong to representatives or members of parliamentary parties who can agree to form or support governments on a party-political basis. And this, in turn, is very satisfying for the format of representative democracies and their understanding of parties as functional structures of a political nature, which arrange the links between civil society and the state and its institutions of power<sup>26</sup>. Other scholars, definitely combining theoretical and practical developments on understanding the phenomenon of parties and party governments in the post-World War II period<sup>27</sup>, instead note that in a representative democracy, any government as a party justifies the attributes that: the party or governments of the government gain control of the executive solely as a result of winning the election; leaders and heads of government are recruited by the government party or parties from their environment; the party or parties of the government, on the basis of political competition, offer voters certain political alternatives; party or parties of the government, being endowed with the positions of ministers and other officials responsible for state policy and the executive branch in general<sup>28</sup>. It is in this way a situation, when party governments in European representative democracies become the center or “core” of the political process and the connection between the state and civil society, although they are determined equally institutionally, electorally, politically and even socially, is achieved<sup>29</sup>.

In this context, it is obvious that, at first sight, the party government is a completely rational format for the development of a “chain” of delegation of power from the people to individual bureaucrats, as it combines political and apolitical logic and components. Therefore, the party government – as it immediately comes to mind – should not be an instrument and a factor

<sup>26</sup> Pasquino G., *Governments in European politics*, [w:] Magone J. (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*, Wyd. Routledge 2015, s. 295-310.

<sup>27</sup> Daalder H., *Countries in Comparative Politics*, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1987, vol 15, nr. 1, s. 3-21.; Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s. 31-71.; Kirkpatrick E., *Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?*, “*American Political Science Review*” 1971, vol 65, nr. 4, s. 965-990.; Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.; Rose R., *The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique*, “*Political Studies*” 1996, vol 17, nr. 4, s. 413-445.; Schattschneider E., *Party Government and Employment Policy*, “*American Political Science Review*” 1945, vol 39, nr. 6, s. 1147-1157.; Thomassen J., *Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?*, [w:] Jennings K., Mann T. (eds.), *Elections at Home and Abroad*, Wyd. Michigan University Press 1994, s. 237-265.

<sup>28</sup> Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, “*West European Politics*” 2008, vol 31, nr. 1-2, s. 211-234.; Romanyuk A., Lytvyn V., *Porivnialnyi analiz politychnykh instytutiv i system krain Zakhidnoi Yevropy. T. 1. Osoblyvosti mizhinstytutsiinykh vidnosyn u Eurykutyku, hlava derzhavy – parlament – uriad*” ta yikhni naslidky dlia politychnoho protsesu, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2020, s. 307.

<sup>29</sup> Eppner S., Ganghof S., *Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: the veto control hypothesis reconsidered*, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2017, vol 56, nr. 1, s. 169-186.; Keman H., *Parties and Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies*, [w:] Katz R., Crotty W. (eds.), *Handbook on Political Parties*, Wyd. Sage 2006, s. 160-174.; Keman H., *Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government*, [w:] Luther K., Müller-Rommel F. (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe: Political and Analytical Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 207-246.; Keman H., *Strategy Development and Variations of Party Government*, Paper presented at the conference “*Political Strategy*” (Lüneburg: Leuphana Universität), 12-13 February 2009.; Panchak-Bialoblotska N., *Uriady menshosti v yevropeiskykh parlamentskykh demokratiakh*, Wyd. Lvivskiyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka 2017.; Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Il potere dell’alternanza. Teorie e ricerche sui cambi di governo*, Wyd. Bononia University Press 2011.; Schmidt M., *The Impact of Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy*, [w:] Keman H. (ed.), *Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research*, Wyd. Sage Publishers 2002, s. 166-184.

in the “decline” or “crisis” of parties, and hence the questioning of the expediency of the very phenomenon of party governance within the framework of European representative democracies. The explanation for this is the fact that the very phenomenon of party government and its nature are not monolithic, after all, the relations between parties and governments are also definitely not of the same kind, and therefore generates different influences of parties on the process of bureaucracy and the overall functionality of the state mechanism. It follows that, on the one hand, it is necessary to understand the heterogeneity or need to classify party governments according to their party structure and composition (imposed on the composition of parliament) and, on the other hand, to distinguish between the concepts and categories of the party governance/government affiliation. In addition, the formation and existence of a party government is also understood quite differently, as some political actors perceive it as involving parties in the government cabinet, while others perceive it as a kind of fascination with the party or parties of the government.

Therefore, in practical politics, the intensity of party involvement in government and the closeness of relations between the government and parties that are not members of it but support it may markedly differ. Moreover, it is not necessary for government parties or parties supporting party governments interfere in the activities of governments, as it is possible to move in the opposite direction when governments intervene and put pressure on parties or even promote the formation of new parties, including through the division of existing parties, in particular government ones<sup>30</sup>. It follows that the obligatory attributes of party governments are, on the one hand, the dependence of these governments on the influence of the party or parties that are part of it, and, on the other hand, the replacement of the staff of such governments, in particular the highest ministerial positions – mainly ministers and the prime minister – by elected officials from among parliamentary and governmental parties, since there must be met the requirement that such officials be accountable to the electorate through their parties.

Instead, the contradictory attribute of party governments is that almost all important government decisions must be decided by the people who won the elections, held by government parties, or by individuals appointed and accountable to such people, although this is not always the case in the real political process<sup>31</sup>.

And this does mean that the links between governments and their supporting parties may not be very close or necessarily close, as it is permissible for two political parties to be autonomous within coalitions (such as bipartisan governments). This is especially important because if there is no relationship between two governing parties, then there is no party government, since such a government exists and operates without regard to political parties, although in

<sup>30</sup> Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s.44.

<sup>31</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.; Katz R., *Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception*, [w:] Castles F., Wildenmann R. (eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1986, s.43.

principle this is extremely rare in European parliamentary democracies. However, there are situations where the government's party affiliation is hampered by the fact that it is legally and normatively autonomous or separated from parliament, which is quite common in European representative democracies: either in almost all policy clusters (as is often the case in Ukraine and Moldova), or in individual policy sectors, in particular in all foreign affairs issues or issues (such as in Belgium, the Netherlands, etc.).

It is against this background of an understanding of the phenomenon of party government in European representative democracies that it is clear that there is a range of opportunities for the relations between the state, government, parties and voters not to be fully in line with theoretical expectations, in particular due to the different – more or less – willingness of political parties and individual party members to distance themselves from the temptation to determine the parameters of the bureaucracy functioning. As a result, purely theoretically in this case it is possible to formalize the partocracy – a situation where there is an “unhealthy” and unnatural symbiosis between those who represent society (party or parties) and those who govern society (namely the government and the sector public service), what, for example, at different times was typical for Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, etc. This is compounded by the fact that party cabinets often put pressure on government parties and parties to support party governments in parliaments, forcing them to agree on policies and policies that do not fully meet the electoral, political and other interests of such parliamentary parties. Sometimes this even leads to a situation where the government does not depend on the party or parties supporting the government in parliament, but on the contrary, although purely in theory such influence should be bilateral.

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that in the conditions of formation and functioning of party-type governments there are different options for relations between government parties, government supporting parties and party governments themselves, in particular regarding the development of political policy of governments and appointments to and out of governments. This is manifested in the fact that party governments may or may not imitate the political programs of the parties that compose them. Accordingly, party governments can or cannot consult their support parties in parliaments when developing their government programs. In this context, it is clear that the “partisanship” of governments is facilitated by both joint consultation with parliamentary parties and joint elaboration of their own governmental courses with parliamentary parties, what is not always possible and is far from the norm for all European representative democracies. Therefore, in this sense, there is good reason to say that the government as a party in form is not always a government as a party in essence, content and political manifestations. This remark acquires a relevant and qualitative meaning against the background of the fact that government officials from one party or parties feel much more influential than deputies from the same parties, and therefore it can significantly adjust the



essence of the party government in practice from the theoretically expected<sup>32</sup>. And this is quite true, because in real politics the ministers of party governments are gradually becoming more independent of their government parties, as they gain prestige and popularity, as a result, government parties and government supporting parties in parliaments often criticize government positions and government cabinets in general to some degree, which is especially true in the case of minority party governments<sup>33</sup>.

All of the above justifies the fact that the characteristics of party governments in European representative democracies differ markedly depending on whether the governing party or parties, in particular the largest / dominant of them, dominate the government, or whether there is a balance between the government and the government parties represented in parliament. It follows that such differences in the structure of party government affect the nature of representative democracy and certain forms and systems of government within it, which in turn affects the nature and types of party governments in them. In this context, the phenomenon of so-called party patronage needs special attention, especially if it takes place in systems similar to partocracy. The point is that in this case, the ruling or governmental parties seek to benefit from all levels and varieties and aspects of the relationship between the government and the governing party or parties, in particular in terms of policy development, appointment and patronage.

The role of patronage is especially important in the context of the formation of coalition party governments, when party leaders and party leaders are unable to separate spheres of influence, in particular in the framework of government programs, and therefore feel frustrated by the achievement of certain inter-party compromises. And in this context, it is valid to conclude that the growth of patronage within party governments can significantly undermine the party affiliation of government cabinets, as, for example, was once the case for Spain, Italy and France, which were and remain systems with very different systems of government. On the other hand, party patronage has traditionally grown in those systems that belong to the Westminster or majority, rather than consensus, type of representative democracy, which is influenced primarily by the majority or most competitive format of inter-party competition between the government and government parties and the government and government parties with opposition parties<sup>34</sup>.

As for another reason for raising the question of the expediency or in expediency of the formation and functioning of party governments in European representative democracies, it should be noted that in political science and political practice for a long time there is a huge attention to the topic of "decline", or "crisis" parties. Some even believe that it is appropriate

<sup>32</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

<sup>33</sup> Strom K., Minority Government and Majority Rule, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; Strom K., Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies, "Comparative Political Studies" 1984, vol 16, nr. 1, s. 199-228.

<sup>34</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

to talk about the “crisis” of parties from the moment they became the basis for the formation and functioning of government cabinets in this part of the world. This problem was especially exacerbated when parties within certain configurations of party systems of individual states (in certain periods of their political history and political process) began technically – due to various crisis situations and conditions – to become incapable in forming and providing support to government cabinets, and in contrast to them sometimes (though as exceptions) so-called non-party or technocratic government cabinets or party-like government cabinets began to emerge, but with a significant share of non-party ministerial staff. This is complemented by the fact that the party as a political organization that reflects or should reflect the interests and needs of certain social groups, cannot be static, but instead is dynamic and changeable, especially in the changing conditions of social and political development (and hence the existing but changing socio-political divisions), which has permanently characterized and still characterizes Europe and it is especially intensified due to the influence of politicized mass media and political discourse<sup>35</sup>.

The fact that in many European countries, including Belgium, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the United Kingdom, France, Ukraine, etc., party functionaries and party goals were very often accused or accused of corruption and illegal behavior. This, in turn, also affects the generation of doubts about the feasibility of forming party governments, in which officials and ministers can be “party” (and therefore probably corrupt) people, although, in contrast, may indicate an increase in the transparency of the political process.

It is also noteworthy that the “decline” or “crisis” of parties occurs in the context of the development of patronage of party governments and governing parties in European representative democracies. This is perhaps the biggest undermining of the theorized nature of party governments in Western democracies. The fact is that it is through patronage, on the one hand, that the “crisis” of the representation of political parties is compensated, in particular reducing their membership and increasing their variability, but, on the other hand, it is patronage that is mistakenly believed to be a way out of a situation that should instead be representative and more natural. As a result, it leads, or at least has the potential to lead to a significant transformation and even collapse of the party system of a state, as a result of which the essence of the phenomenon of party government is lost. Against this background, it is clear that partocracy can be effective only in a limited number of cases, in particular, when it is able to ensure the effectiveness of the party government in order to reach compromises and reduce political tensions or crises. It follows that partocracy with its patronage component – as one of the manifestations of the deformation of party government and the “crisis” of the party phenomenon – can only be acceptable as long as its supporters believe that political decisions must be made jointly

<sup>35</sup> Blondel J., Cotta M., *Party and Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting parties in Liberal Democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996; Blondel J., Cotta M., *The Nature of Party Government: A Comparative European Perspective*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2000.

and on the basis of compromise. However, if at least one of the partners in the government cabinet – the party's government coalition – challenges this basic principle, then the basis for a “contract” and consensus based on patronage no longer exists.

In general, it follows that the deformation of the essence of party government in European representative democracies is or can be both immanent and acquired. It is immanent due to the fact that the party government is heterogeneous in the formats of the relationship between the political and bureaucratic components, and therefore determines or at least determines the party-patronage. The acquisition of defects in party governance lies in the fact that in recent years there has been a growing “crisis” of the nature and peculiarities of parties and inter-party competition, as a result of which parties are increasingly unable to resolve current agenda issues and sometimes negotiate on the formation of governments on a party basis<sup>36</sup>.

As a result, this often leads to the formation of either non-partisan governments or technocratic governments, or non-partisan or so-called semi-partisan governments. Although purely visually and constructively, as well as in the nature of support in parliaments, party governments are still predominant in European representative democracies, but now they have obvious alternatives. On the other hand, these problems of party governments have been largely obvious and quite noticeable in the past, but this has not changed the nature of the prevailing party governments in the region. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the “crisis” of parties has not been finalized, and therefore it has incompletely or insufficiently destroyed the existing party systems of certain countries in Europe, and therefore the latter continue to produce various forms of party governments. Although, on the contrary, this does not mean that the parties will not decline in the future, including due to significant patronage, and therefore this allotment will undermine the theorized nature of party governments.

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